Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1976

Sally M. Martinez and the State of Utah, By And
Through Utah State Department of Social Services
v. Eugenio Max Romero : Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Samuel King; Attorney for RespondentVERNON B. ROMNEY, STEPHEN G. SCHWENDIMAN;
Attorneys for Appellant
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Martinez v. Romero, No. 14573 (Utah Supreme Court, 1976).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/328

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
SALLY M. MARTINEZ and the STATE OF *
UTAH, by and through Utah State
Department of Social Services,
*
Plaintiffs and
Appellants,

*
*

v.

No. 14573

*

EUGENIO MAX ROMERO,

*

Defendant and
Respondent.

*

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

SAMUEL KING
409 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Respondent.
VERNON B. ROMNEY .
Utah Attorney General
STEPHEN G. SCHWENDIMAN
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorneys for Appellants.
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5

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Concurs in appellants' statement.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Concurs in appellants' statement.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmation of the ruling of the lower
court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent concurs in appellants' statement and adds that
he simply denies being father of the child.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
APPELLANTS' SOCIAL ARGUMENT IS
NOT DETERMINATIVE OF THIS CASE.
The main thrust of appellants' brief is not that the statutes are not clear.

Although there is some overlap and omission

in the statutes, the wording is not nebulous as regards the time
limits for conunencement of a paternity or support action and
appellants have exceeded these.

The 1975 amendment to §78-12-22

provides:
"WITHIN EIGHT YEARS. - within eight years: . . . an action
to enforce any liability due or to become due, for failure
to provide support or maintenance for dependent children."
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The law will be argued in following points.
Appellants' real argument is a powerful social and moral
argument that a child should not be bastardized and deprived of
his father, and accordingly, the court should do anything it Cll\
to avoid application of the statute of limitations.

I

I

Respondent's counsel, having adopted children of his own, I
finds this argument goes strongly to his own conscience.
There are, however, contra arguments that must be considered.
Appellants' argument lends itself to the idea that the
child's social wrongs can be redressed by having respondent name:
as his father.
Unfortunately, this is not entirely so.
We should distinguish benefits to the child himself froo
benefits to society.
Addressing ourselves first to the benefits to the child,
what is a father?

A family name is important but adopted childr:1

often do nicely al though they know the man who raises them is no:I
,

I

their real father, and that their real father, for whatever his
reasons, didn't stand up when it was to be counted.
It might be considered that a real father is a relationsh:J
The man who gives time, his love, himself, to the child, might
be a real father.

That man who is willing to act as father is~

more important to the child than is the man who, by accident
blood, is the true father.
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The point is that a functioning relationship, rather than
a legal position, is the essence of a father - child relationship.
It would be desirable

if the father of an illegitimate

child had the power to provide this relationship to the child.
He can't except at the grace of the mother.
is sole custodial parent.

Under Utah law, she

In Re State in the Interest of Baby

Girl M, 25 U2d 101, 476 P2d 1013.
In fairness, it should be noted that in future cases, it
is possible that a father might be able to claim a visiting privilege under the language of the 1975 amendment to the adoption
code, §78-30-4 (3), UCA, which provides:
"(a) A person who is the father or claims to be the
father of an illegitimate child may claim rights pertaining to his paternity of the child by registering
with the Bureau of Vital Statistics of the Division
of Health, Utah Department of Social Services, a notice
of his claim of paternity of an illegitimate child and
of his willingness and intent to support the child to
the best of his ability."
No limitation is provided.

Accordingly, should the father

of an out-of-wedlock child wish to exercise parental rights, he
would have to comply with §78-12-25 (2), UCA (1953):
"WITHIN FOUR YEARS. --- within four years: (2) an action
for relief not otherwise provided for by law."
Applying the concept of visiting, the father - child relationship, to this case, we can conclude from the pleadings that
here we have no functioning relationship, no acknowledgment of
paternity, no visits and payment of money, because such would
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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have been plead in response to respondent's Motion for Swnmary '
Judgment, to toll the statute or estop respondent from raising
We might also assume that the mother, as she might have
been able to do something to get father and child together if

5,,

1

wished, does not favor such a relationship in the future.
In regard to the question of "Who am I?", that a child
asks, the most to be gained here is an answer along the lines

o:

I
I

"My mother says 'X' is my father, the jury says 'X' is my father
but 'X' says he isn't.

II

Is this clearly of benefit to the Chik:

In sum, the human benefit to this child is speculative.
There is an advantage to the child to have a father
it.

This is not disputed.

~ ~

Here, though, if the mother intende:I

to establish an existence free of welfare, and its standard of I
living, she could have done so long ago.

Eight years on welfare

indicates a chronic condition.
She could have filed this action years back to get the
come from respondent, if he were proved liable, to help free her I
I

from welfare.

She chose not to do so.

I

The only tangible advantage we really have is reimbursemd
of the State and its taxpayers.
This also is not disputed as being a proper and import~'
goal, in theory.
In practice, though, in this case, where was the State''
enforcement arm over the last eight years?

If the mother ever

named respondent as father, the action could have been brought
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during her pregnancy (§78-45a-6, UCA 1965), or in any of the
years since.
The results of the State's failure to act are:

(1) a large

lump obligation for respondent to meet if he is found to be the
father;

(2)

loss of his factual ability through attrition of time

to fairly present his defenses;

(3) forfeiture without chance of

recovery by the State of its first four years of payment to the
mother, including the substantial medical bills
birth (§78-45a-3, 1965);

that attend a

(4) hazarding by the State of the whole

sum if the father should move to places unknown or die and time
for claims run out during the period.
Statutes of limitations are cruel.

It is their nature.

They arbitrarily cut off existing rights that are often legitimate
and important.

The statutes are justified by the social need to

have controversy come to an end.

This is well stated at 51 AmJur

2d, Limitation of Actions, §17, page 602,
"The primary purpose of a statute of limitations is to
compel the exercise of a right of action within a reasonable time so that the opposing party has a fair opportunity to defend.
"Statutes of limitation are founded upon the general experience of mankind that claims which are valid are not
usually allowed to remain neglected if the right to sue
thereon exists. Statutes of limitation are designed to
prevent undue delay in bringing suit on claims and suppress
fraudulent and stale claims from being asserted, to the
surprise of the parties or their representatives, when
all the proper vouchers and evidence are lost, or the
facts have become obscure from the lapse of time or the
defective memory or death or removal of witnesses."
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Appellants argue in their brief that they, rather than

re;

spondent, are damaged by delay in the presentation of evidence
at trial.

This could be a practical point as a jury might

te~

against an old claim.

I
I
The real burden of delay though has to be on the defendu:I

party.

I
The mother can establish a prima facie case simply by

testifying that respondent was the only man with whom she had
sexual relations during her period of conception.
might be rebutted by defendant to some degree.

Such testimon:\

I

This kind of

evidence results in coin tosses by the trier of facts as to

whic:[

I

party has the knack of being more convincing.
Time is the enemy of the defense because a proper defense

I

is primarily detective work - finding data and witnesses to prov;!
the claim is not proper.

This task can become impossible as tirre 1
I

runs, witnesses die or move, and facts become unavailable.

Appd

here, how does respondent now prove what he was doing on a certa:j
day in 1967 (when conception occurred) or how does he now find

\
I

witnesses who were then boyfriends of the mother?
In setting the statute of limitations at eight years, t~
Legislature set a time limit years greater than in most cases.
Should this limitation period be too short, it is for the Legis·
lature, as representative of the people, to consider all soci 3 i,
economic and legal issues, and determine what revisions shoulc,
made.
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This point was recently considered by our appellate court
in Shelmidine v. Jones, et al., case number 14152, filed May 20,
1976, the court saying:
"Also, it should be borne in mind that there is a definite distinction between a change in interpretation or
application of a statute, which sometimes quite justifiably occurs, and attempting by judicial fiat to
affect a substantial change in law as clearly expressed
in statute or the constitution. When such a substantial
change is necessary or desirable, our constitution has
set up procedures for the change by the legislature,
or of the constitution, by the amendment process."

POINT II.
PLAINTIFFS' CASE IS BARRED BY
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
The "Bastardy Act", §77-60-1

et seq., UCA 1953, should be

mentioned although it is not controlling.

It provides, at §77-

60-15,
"No prosecution under this chapter shall be brought
after four years from the birth of such child; provided, that the time the person accused shall be
absent from the state shall not be computed."
As this period is limited by its terms to Bastardy Act
actions, it does not seem pertinent to this case, even though in
State v. Judd, 27 U2d 79, 493 P2d 604, it was held that the
Bastardy Act survives as a companion alternative to proceedings
under the Uniform Act on Paternity, 78-45a, UCA, the main difference between the two Acts stated as being that under the Bastardy
Act, the mother alone can bring the action, while under the

-7-
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Uniform Act on Paternity, it can be brought by the mother or by·
the public authority chargeable with support of the child.
Let us look to the other statutes.
The Uniform Act on Paternity, 78-45a, UCA, was enacted

i:.

The Paternity Act has no statute of limitations in it,

~

I
i

1965.

provision stating how many years after birth of a child an acti::I
may be commenced.

Instead, it has a provision stating that:

I

"78-45a-3. LIMITATION ON RECOVERY FROM THE FATHER. --The father's liabilities for past education and necessary support are limited to a period of four years
next preceding the commencement of an action."
This section has not been interpreted by Utah cases.
its language, its purpose seems clear.

!

By

It controls the accurnu· \

lation of arrearage the father has to pay by limiting the recov:l
period.

The section fails entirely to provide for when an act1o:i
I

I

may be commenced.
This omission was rectified by the Utah Legislature in
1975 when it added a new paragraph to the general eight year

std

I

of limitations, which reads:
"78-12-22. WITHIN EIGHT YEARS.---within eight years.
"An Action to enforce any liability due or to become
due for failure to provide support or maintenance for
dependent children." (emphasis added)
This enactment covers any kind of case brought to enforce
support.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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It actually benefits the State and mother by giving them
four more years than they had before in which to bring the action.
Before the amendment to §78-12-22, the Bastardy Act with
its four year provision might have been controlling, in view of
the language in State v. Judd, supra, that the two acts were to
be reasonably correlated.

If not, the mother's time of recovery

was limited because, the Paternity Act being silent, the action
would be governed by §78-12-26(4), UCA, which provides a three
year limitation for "An action for a liability created by the
statutes of this state, other than for a penalty or forfeiture
under the laws of this state, except where in special cases a
different limitation is prescribed by the statutes of this state."
(Emphasis added)
The amendment to 78-12-22 also reconciled the conflict
of the limitation periods just cited with the four year arrearage
stopper established in the Paternity Act.
It will be noted that the word "paternity" does not appear
in §78-12-22.

The word is not needed and was undoubtedly omitted

by purpose so as not to interfere with determinations of heirship
or other cases were a proper issue might arise involving the
establishment of paternity.
A right without a remedy is no right at all, as the pragmatics of our legal history have it.

§78-12-22 effectively stopping

the remedy of recovery of support, it properly left open determination of Sponsored
paternity
for those special cases where it is necessary.
by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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POINT III.
THE FACT THAT A MINOR IS INVOLVED IN
THIS LITIGATION DOES NOT TOLL THE
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
"78-12-36. EFFECTIVE DISABILITY.---if a person entitl~
to bring an action, other than for recovery of real
property, is at the ti.me the cause accrued, either:
"(l) under the age of majority; . .
"The time of such disability is not a part
limited for conunencement of the action."

of the time

Under our law, a minor is not entitled to bring an actior.
for his own support.
In this case, the child is not even a party to the actio;
"Sally M. Martinez and the State of Utah, by and through
Utah State Department of Social Services,"
are plaintiffs and appellants.
As stated in the recent case, Stanton v. Stanton, Case

n9

14268, Utah, filed June 23, 1976, in both the main and concurrir,:i
opinion, it was held that a child does not have standing before
the court in matters concerning recovery of his own support.
Right to the action is held by the person who has the responsi·
bility for the support, be it mother, guardian or state agency.
As a second reason for determining that the statute of
limitations is not tolled by minority of the child, it must be
remembered that recovery of support from the father of an illeg:'.i
mate child is entirely governed by statute and did not exist
common law.
25 Utah 2d

ar

In re State of Utah in the Interest of Baby Gi~
101, 476 P2d 1013.
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A comparable line of cases are those in which injured
children are barred in their claims against cities because not
timely filed even though the children remained minor at the time
of filing.

Greenhalgh v. Payson City, 530 P2d 799 (Utah 1975);

Gallegos v. Midvale City, 27 U2d 27, 492 P2d 1335; and Hurley v.
Bingham, 63 Utah 589, 228 P. 213.
In those cases, the difficulty of a municipality in assembling its evidence when a stale claim is presented was a factor,
as was the factor that the parents had active control of their
children and could have acted promptly for their benefit if they
had chosen to.
The major factor and the one that matches the concepts in
the case at bar was that a claim against a city is entirely a
creation of statute, being formerly barred by sovereign immunity,
except as since specifically allowed by statute.
Gallegos, supra, cited Hurley, supra,
" . . . as the right to any damages at all is purely
statutory, it can only be availed of when there has
been a reasonable effort to comply with the conditions
upon which the right is conferred."
That rationale precisely parallels the instant case.

First,

the right to support was conferred by the Bastardy Act with its
four year period of limitations.

This right was broadened by

the Paternity Act which omitted limitations.

This omission was

cured by the Legislature in its amendment of §78-12-22 setting
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the eight year limit which now controls.

Thus, both the right,

and the limitation of the right are exclusively statutory crea-

I

tions, and so prevent tolling of the statute due to minority o!:

i

the child.
CONCLUSION

It is grievous that the child in this case does not have
a known father, but it is too late now to do much to benefit
personally.

h~I

More grievous, because of its duty to protect the

!

taxpayer and those who receive family assistance, is the failur:'
of the State of Utah to file an action of this type promptly.
Summary judgment cf the trial court should be affirmed.
DATED July 29, 1976.
Respectfully submitted,

SAMUEL KING
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